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BSTRACT
 
The Turkish migrant community is in many European countries one of the
largest minority groups. Although the Turks have lived for many decades in different
European countries, they remain rather marginalized in the host societies. This study looks
into the socio-economic position of the Turkish population in Austria and Belgium, two rela-
tively small countries. Although there are many differences and similarities between both
countries and although many success stories can be found on an individual level, the main
conclusion that can be drawn in this contribution is that many Turkish immigrants fail to
integrate and/or to find their position in their host societies.
 
Introduction
 
Turkish migrant workers make up a significant proportion of the immigrant population
of Austria and Belgium. The first arrivals of Turkish migrant workers in
these countries was part of the wave of Turkish immigration that began in the early
1960s in response to a labor shortage in the Federal Republic of Germany,
which signed a bilateral agreement with Turkey in October 1961, regulating the short-
term immigration of Turkish workers. The economic situation in many other European
countries was similar to the German one and shortly after Austria (1964), Belgium
(1964), and other European countries (Netherlands, France, Sweden and Switzerland)
signed bilateral agreements with Turkey. The immigration that had been meant to be
temporary had become long term. The 40th anniversary of the bilateral agreement has
been celebrated recently. Turkish immigrants have been part of the scene in various
European countries for many years, but does this mean that they fully participate in
society? Are they well integrated? This study will try to answer these questions.
Austria and Belgium have a different history and a different geopolitical position.
The context in both countries is, however, fairly similar. Austria and Belgium
are both highly developed “corporatist welfare states.” Together with the other
countries of the so-called “continental regime type,” France, Germany and Luxem-
burg, they have well-developed social security schemes, but not as universalistic as
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in the Nordic countries. In general, there is a strong relationship between previous
occupations and entitlement to provisions, and generous income protection for fami-
lies with children. Employees are well protected against dismissal. The number of
special schemes for occupational groups is high, and there is extensive collective
coverage for civil servants. Pension benefits in the continental regime are slightly
above the European average.
 
1
 
 The continental welfare system is an expensive
system, with a broad coverage that might attract immigrants, and consequently
bring about anti-immigrant sentiments. On the other hand, the system might need
immigrant labor power to keep it turning in the future.
Austria and Belgium continue to deny that they are officially immigration coun-
tries, but in fact the migrant community has gained access to the welfare system and
has become very much settled. This has led in both countries, as in many other
European countries, to political reaction. Right-wing, anti-immigrant parties are a
major force in both countries. The Austrian 
 
FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
 
)
and the Flemish 
 
Vlaams Belang
 
2
 
 are both right-wing parties. While the FPÖ is more
of a populist party, and the Vlaams Belang is more a one-issue anti-immigrant
party,
 
3
 
 and the profile of the electorate voting for both parties might differ, neverthe-
less, both parties campaign against immigration. They oppose the entry of new
immigrants and demand that settled immigrants must assimilate or leave. These
ideas and the political context are far from unique. Similar anti-immigrant parties
are on the rise in countries such as Denmark, France, Italy and Switzerland. Similar
developments are observed even in countries that traditionally held a more tolerant
attitude, such as the Netherlands.
The position of the Turkish population in West European countries is important in
the discussion of problems associated with the integration of immigrants since it
represents a large share of the (non-EU) foreigners living in these countries, includ-
ing in Austria and Belgium. The largest groups of non-EU foreigners in Austria are
the nationals of the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. The two main non-EU national-
ities in Belgium are Moroccans and Turks. In both countries, Turks are often
presented as the least integrated group of immigrants.
One of the first questions that arise when addressing the issue of how well
Turkish migrants are integrated within their guest societies is what is meant by inte-
gration. Integration can be defined as a continuous long-term two-way process. The
two-way process implies the involvement of the immigrant (the individuals, institu-
tions and organizations) and individuals, institutions and organizations of the
receiving society. Successful integration can be determined by how well migrants
participate in the social, economic and political life of the host community.
Nonetheless, there is no generally accepted theory of integration. Research
approaches differ both between and within disciplines. An often used distinction is
the one between social integration, cultural integration and structural integration.
 
4
 
Social integration
 
 refers to the degree of interaction between immigrant and native
population groups. The policy concern here is about segregation versus mixing.
 
Cultural integration
 
 relates to the degree to which various population groups
share the same norms, values and preferences. Examples given here are, for
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instance, ideas and attitudes towards gender equality or on the role of religion in the
organization of society. 
 
Structural integration
 
 implies here that immigrants and
their descendants have equal access to the major institutions of society, such as
education, the labor and housing markets, the political system, health care services,
and so on. The obvious policy goal here is the elimination of differences between
immigrant and native population groups.
 
5
 
The purpose of this contribution is to examine some of the challenges associated
with the structural integration of Turkish immigrants in both countries. The primary
focus will be on integration into the labor market and in the area of education. Other
important issues like access to health care and housing will not be covered. The
issue of political participation of Turkish immigrants in Belgium is scrutinized by
Dirk Jacobs, Marc Swyngedouw and Karen Phalet, while Christiane Timmerman
examines the issue of gender in the context of the integration of Turkish immigrants
in Belgium elsewhere in this volume.
 
Turkish Immigrants and the Challenges of Integration in Austria
 
Austria, a country with a population of eight million, has experienced over the last
two centuries various forms of international migration: immigration, emigration and
transit migration, the latter due to the geopolitical position of the country. In the
postwar period there were four waves of immigration in the form of refugees to
Austria. These flows occurred as a result of events stemming from Soviet domi-
nance and repression in Eastern European countries. These flows consisted of
Hungarians (1956), Czechs (1968), Poles (1981) and Jews from the Soviet Union.
Subsequent to the instability and violence after the collapse of the Soviet Union and
former Yugoslavia, Austria also experienced a significant flow of refugees into the
country in the first half of the 1990s. Additionally, there were Turkish nationals who
sought asylum in Austria in the 1980s and 1990s.
However, there was also significant economically motivated immigration into
Austria. The economic situation of Austria in the early 1960s was of almost full
employment and there was need for extra manpower. From the beginning of the
1960s until the mid-1970s this led to the recruitment of guest workers, mainly from
Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, to meet the employment demands of a growing
economy. Originally, the goal of most of these “guest workers” was to be employed
abroad and to save enough money to take back home. By the early 1970s, it became
clear that the presence of the Turkish community changed from temporary to perma-
nent. The reaction to the oil crisis of 1973 was similar in most western countries: to
stop further immigration, to encourage those who had arrived previously to return
home and to require from those who stay to assimilate into the host society. The
Yugoslavs on the whole opted to return home. The Turks chose to stay, which
subsequently led to an increase in family reunification. The proportion of Turkish
residents in Austria grew from 7.7 percent of all foreigners in 1971 to 22.2 percent
in 2001 or 160,000 Turkish citizens.
 
6
 
 An economic boom in the late 1980s created
renewed labor shortages in some sectors, following which employers looked to
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the traditional sources of labor from South-Eastern Europe to fill these slots. The
number of Yugoslavs residing in Austria rose due to the crisis and the war in
Yugoslavia. In 1990, Austria’s policymakers also regularized the employment status
of 29,100 foreigners hitherto illegally employed. The number of non-nationals in
Austria doubled from 344,000 in 1988 to 690,000 in 1993. The share of foreign
workers of all employed people rose from 5.4 percent to 9.1 percent.
 
7
 
Austria’s diverse immigrant population has become even more so in recent years.
According to the 2001 census, of Austria’s eight million inhabitants more than
730,000 (or 9.1 percent) were foreign residents, with 62.8 percent of them coming
from the successor states of the former Yugoslavia and from Turkey. Between 1985
and 2001, over 254,000 foreigners were naturalized. Austria’s proportion of foreign-
born residents in 2001 was even higher than that of the United States, reaching a
level of 12.5 percent.
 
8
 
Yet Austria does not consider itself a traditional country of immigration. This is
clearly reflected by recent immigration policies. Widespread public discontent over
levels of immigration in the early 1990s led to a curtailment of the traditional labor
migration and family reunification programs, supporting the official line that
Austria is not a traditional country of immigration. On the other hand, this does not
mean that Austria wishes to close all possibilities for entering the country legally.
The country’s accession to the European Union (EU) and the joining of the
Schengen Agreement has brought more open borders in a sense that there is free
circulation between Schengen countries.
 
9
 
 Furthermore, there are quotas for foreign
seasonal workers, which enabled the admittance of thousands of temporary workers.
Austria has a long tradition of seasonal labor to meet companies’ exceptional short-
term demand for labor, especially in typically seasonal branches such as tourism and
agriculture. The legal status of foreign seasonal workers differs considerably from
that of all other resident or foreign workers in Austria. Their employment and resi-
dence permits are limited in time, they are prohibited from bringing their family to
Austria and their residence permit is linked to their contract with a single employer,
to whom they are bound: they are prohibited from moving freely on the labor market
and finding another employer. When the employment term is up, the foreign worker
must subsequently leave the country, since termination of employment also means
the loss of residence permit. These foreign seasonal workers are not looked upon as
immigrants but as part of an “international labor supply system” that can be utilized
without having to maintain welfare and integration standards in regard to these
foreign workers. The foreign workers have to pay unemployment insurance contri-
butions, but are not entitled to unemployment allowances. In recent years, seasonal
labor has been playing an increasingly important part in Austria’s labor market,
since the government has pursued a generous quota policy for foreign seasonal
workers and has opened access to this kind of employment to all sectors.
 
10
 
Critics have argued that this regulation may initiate a new “guest-worker regime,”
with thousands of foreign workers coming into Austria—even if interrupted by short
periods of absence—for whom all legal paths to consolidate residency are closed.
The history of the guest-worker regime in Austria has been similar to that of
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many other non-immigration countries of Europe: It is a system where temporary
migration has a tendency to become permanent. This has had, of course, long-run
repercussions in terms of the size and composition of the immigrant population in
Austria. This naturally will continue to keep the issue of integration of especially
non-EU immigrants high up on the agenda of Austrian policymaking and politics.
How these conflicting policies are to be reconciled remains an unanswered ques-
tion.
 
11
 
 The immigrant himself/herself has become involved directly through the so-
called 2002 “Integration Contract” (
 
Integrationsvertrag
 
), which is a recent political
measure of Austrian integration policy. It is, according to Böse and others, a one-
sided obligation on the part of the immigrants, who have to deliver specified
evidence of being “integrated” as defined in the regulations, such as passing a
German-language proficiency exam. In case of failure the immigrants can lose their
residency permits.
 
12
 
Due to Austria’s conservative political culture and the special form of its postwar
nation-state building, the integration and naturalization of these immigrants and
their descendants is, according to Fabian Georgi, even more problematic than in
most of the other European countries.
 
13
 
 The Austrian nation-building process stems
from that of the Austro-Hungarian period, contending on the one hand with a heter-
ogeneous population and on the other hand with the formation of German national-
ism. Austria’s assimilation or “nationalization” policy towards cultural minorities
was a clear and conscious strategy implemented by the ruling elite of the time. This
policy has led to an almost complete assimilation of most of the non-German groups
in the Republic of Austria by the mid-twentieth century. The Austrian conception of
the integration of migrant communities is a continuation of the strategy adopted
towards the national minorities: integration is understood as a form of assimilation.
According to Georgi, there is wide-ranging social and political exclusion in compar-
ison with other Western European countries towards migrants. Moreover, the legal
situation concerning political rights, security of residence and naturalization is one
of the most restrictive in Europe.
 
14
 
This situation is reflected in the new Naturalization Act that was passed in 1998,
which retained the principle of 
 
jus sanguinis
 
15
 
 and a regular waiting period of ten
years for naturalization. According to the new law, the individual immigrant who
wishes to acquire Austrian nationality has to show that he or she is integrated into
Austrian society and has to give proof that he or she is economically self-suffi-
cient—that is, not in need of social assistance—and sufficiently proficient in
German. Minor criminal offences now constitute reasons for denial of citizenship.
 
16
 
A migrant may now acquire citizenship based on a legal claim after a period of
15 years on grounds of good integration. Still, in the majority of cases, Austrian citi-
zenship is awarded to people without a legal claim on a discretionary basis after
10 years of continuous residence.
 
17
 
 Since 1998, the number of naturalizations has
continued to increase from 17,786 in 1998 (of whom 5,683 were Turks) to 31,731 in
2001 (of whom almost one-third were Turks). According to the Essen-based Center
for Studies on Turkey, 53 percent of Turks living in Austria are naturalized.
 
18
 
 This
is largely due to demographic reasons: most migrants who entered Austria in
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the period of renewed immigration between 1988 and 1993 are now eligible for
citizenship on a discretionary basis.
 
19
 
 The Austrian Labor Force survey,
 
20
 
 which
provides information on both place of birth and citizenship of individuals surveyed,
shows that around 40,000 Austrians have their place of birth in Turkey. Adding
these people to the number of Turkish citizens residing in Austria gives a total of
200,000 Turks living in the country.
 
21
 
Immigration policy until 1987 was seen purely as a function of labor-market
policy and was mainly under the responsibility of the Ministry for Social Affairs.
The Ministry of the Interior, after having played only a minor role in the past, joined
the former as an actor from 1991 onwards, when immigration policy was influenced
by factors other than solely the labor market policy.
 
22
 
 The political landscape had
changed in Austria and immigration issues began to emerge on the political agenda.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the considerable influx of immigrants and the rising
unemployment rates caused heated discussions in the media and in the political
arena about immigration into Austria.
At first, the legal framework that regulated residence and labor-market access for
non-Austrians was not altered (apart from some minor changes to the existing regu-
lations). The approach to “guest-worker” schemes was maintained. A national quota
system (
 
Bundeshöchstzahl
 
) was introduced for work permits. The yearly-fixed
quotas varied from 8 percent to 10 percent of the total workforce. However, the
political atmosphere eventually led to more restrictive regulations concerning labor
market access and immigration which were modified several times in recent years.
 
23
 
In 2002, for instance, the immigration quota for less skilled labor was abolished
completely, with the result that poorly qualified “third-country nationals” seeking to
enter the Austrian labor market have had little chance of success since then. The
government is expected to maintain its restrictive policy line regarding immigration.
The Foreigners’ Employment Act (
 
Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz
 
) from 1975
states that after eight years of permanent employment a foreigner can obtain the so-
called “Befreiungsschein” (exemption document)—limited to two years, but
renewable—which allows the employee to change employer.
 
24
 
 The Foreigners’
Employment Act remains one of the primary control mechanisms of foreign
employment. This type of regulation has been an important factor in causing ethnic
segmentation of the labor market, curtailing the integration of immigrants in
general. Also, as migrant workers cannot change jobs as a rule, they become heavily
dependent on their employers and are open to abuse or exploitation.
 
25
 
 These devel-
opments have put the migrant population in Austria in an uncertain position. The
regulations were adapted in 1997. In that year, the new Aliens Act merged two
previous Acts, the 1992 Aliens Act and the 1993 Residence Act, into a single law
aiming at the promotion of integration of aliens already present in Austria. The 1992
Aliens Act tightened up regulations on the entry and residence of foreigners and the
1993 Residence Act, established 
 
contingents
 
 for different categories of migrants. In
contrast to the quota used for the issuing of work permits, the contingents for resi-
dence permits defined the absolute number of permits that would be issued in any
single year.
 
26
 
 A major feature of this 1997 reform included an improvement of the
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legal position of immigrants residing in Austria for at least eight years and children
born in Austria, by removing the possibility of expulsion in their case. The Act
weakened, however, the position of immigrants residing in Austria for less than
eight years, for whom expulsions have become a more realistic threat. To be in
employment and obtain sufficient income is still a vital requirement for non-
Austrian citizens. Extended periods of unemployment can cost immigrants the legal
base of their stay.
 
27
 
 These factors constitute additional challenges to ensuring a
better integration of immigrants.
In January 2000, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), which ran an anti-immigrant
campaign, formed a coalition government with the People’s Party (ÖVP). In July
2002, parliament adopted major amendments to the Aliens Act and the Asylum Law.
The reforms introduced new regulations in three important areas. Jandl and Kraler
summarize them as follows.
 
28
 
 First, labor immigration has been restricted mainly to
key personnel, with a minimum wage requirement of around 2,000 per month for
prospective migrants. Second, and in stark contrast to the first category of migrants,
the employment of seasonal workers will be greatly facilitated by allowing such
laborers in areas outside agriculture and tourism and extending the employment
period to up to one year. Third, all new immigrants from non-EU third countries
(plus those who have been living in Austria since 1998) are required to attend “inte-
gration courses” consisting mainly of language instruction and a basic introduction
to the law, history and politics of Austria. Non-participation will lead to sanctions,
both financial and legal, for instance the denial of more secure residence titles. The
ultimate fate of non-compliant foreigners could be expulsion from Austria.
Another major challenge that Turkish immigrants face in respect of structural
integration is in the area of education. Schooling is compulsory in Austria for all
children between the ages of 6 and 15, regardless of their nationality and whether
they have a residence permit or not. The situation of children with an immigrant
background is marked in the Austrian education system by inequality. The segrega-
tion of migrant children in the education system is to a large extent due to the social
position of the parents. The first Turkish “guest workers” had a rural background
and a fairly low level of education. These unfavorable conditions were to a large
extent inherited by the following generations. Three-quarters of the Turkish migrant
population have attained only primary education. Another 15 percent has completed
an apprenticeship. In terms of education, no other migrant group has fared as poorly
as the Turks.
 
29
 
A direct effect of the low educational qualifications is a poor position in the labor
market. The Turkish laborers work mainly as blue-collar workers, earning less than
their Austrian counterparts. They are employed as unskilled or semi-skilled
workers. Only a minority is employed as white-collar workers. Turkish laborers are
overrepresented in a number of sectors of the Austrian labor market. Their niches
are mainly industry and the service sectors. Employment in the manufacturing
industries has decreased during the last few decades while the service sector showed
a rising share of employment.
 
30
 
 The sectors with the largest shares of immigrant
workers are construction, catering, and cleaning, which are also the sectors with the
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highest concentration of unskilled labor and very limited chances for upward mobil-
ity.
 
31
 
 The first-generation migrants worked in these “ethnic niches,” but so did a
large part of the second generation. The next generations are not significantly better
educated than the generation of their parents, and thus take up similar positions in
the labor market. A glance at the statistics presented in the Austrian Labor Force
Survey shows that Turks with an Austrian nationality do only slightly better than
Turkish nationals working in Austria. According to the same Labor Force survey,
Turks are significantly less often self-employed than the Austrian population or
other migrants. Compared to the 12.5 percent of self-employed among the Austrian
population and 7.6 percent among the (non-Turkish) migrant population, only
1.4 percent of the Turkish residents are self-employed. According to the survey,
Turks with an Austrian nationality fare almost as well as the group called “other
foreigners.” This is due to the legislation: A basic requirement for obtaining a trade
license is to be an Austrian or to have an Austrian partner.
 
32
 
 Ethnic entrepreneurs
can be found in the areas of Vienna with a high concentration of foreigners.
Male Turks have a higher employment rate than the average Austrian (male)
population. The Turkish women, however, are less present on the labor market. As
extended periods of unemployment can cost immigrants the legal base of their stay,
there is more pressure on foreign workers to find a new job as soon as possible than
there is for unemployed Austrians. Therefore they are much more likely to accept
even low-paid or low-quality jobs. This tends to enforce the segmentation of the
labor market. The economic and political pressure on immigrants leads to a situation
in which, contrary to many other countries, activity rates for foreign women and
men are considerably higher than those of Austrians.
 
33
 
 Also the average unemploy-
ment rate of immigrants in Austria exceeds the overall unemployment rate only by
1–2 percent.
 
34
 
Georgi observes that since the beginning of the twentieth century, assimilation
has been the major strategy for integrating cultural and linguistic minorities in
Austria. He describes Austria as an apparently homogeneous society that still expe-
riences conflict with and discrimination against its “old minority groups”
 
35
 
 while
“new” immigrant minorities (mainly Turks and people from the former Yugoslavia),
pose new problems and challenges. Georgi concludes that on the one hand new
minorities still experience pressure to assimilate and that on the other hand, as a
result of Austrian society’s hostility towards them, they nevertheless experience
structural social segregation and political exclusion.
 
36
 
 As a result, these groups,
including the Turks, remain marginalized and segregated, and even the third-genera-
tion descendants of the former guest workers in Austria tend to have higher unem-
ployment rates, lower wages, less educational success and poorer housing
conditions than that of the Austrian host society.
 
37
 
Turkish Immigrants and the Challenges of Integration in Belgium
 
Belgium, a country with a population of 10 million, is home to many immigrants
and asylum seekers. Immigration into Belgium was and is mainly European due to
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its strong attraction for many EU citizens, especially the French and the Dutch.
Approximately 63 percent of foreigners in Belgium are EU nationals. Non-EU
immigration to Belgium began first with Southern European migrants and later with
Moroccans and Turks who were recruited in the 1960s to work in the coal mines.
The Belgian government signed up several bilateral agreements to bring in foreign
labor to compensate for the declining domestic workforce. These agreements were
first signed with Italy in 1946, followed by Spain in 1956, Greece in 1957, Morocco
and Turkey in 1964, Tunisia in 1969, Algeria in 1970, and Yugoslavia in 1970. The
Moroccan and Turkish communities are the most numerous migrant communities
among non-EU citizens. More than 8.8 percent of Belgium’s population is of
foreign origin. However, if one considers the total number of persons who at birth
did not have Belgian nationality, it is found that the population of foreign origin is
much higher, reaching almost 13 percent of the Belgian population. Thirty-six
percent of the 202,786 persons who received Belgian nationality between 1995 and
2000 were Moroccans; 24 percent of them had a Turkish background and 6 percent
were Italian.
 
38
 
Turkish migrants mainly originate from a cluster of central Anatolian provinces.
Nearly 60 percent of first-generation Turkish migrants living in Belgium were born
in the countryside or in a small village.
 
39
 
 According to data on migrants from the
State Institute of Statistics in Ankara, the three provinces that provided the most
Turkish immigrants are Afyon, Eskisehir and Kayseri. Almost one-third of the
Turkish immigrants in Belgium originate from Afyon, in particular Emirda .
 
40
 
Contrary to some other immigrant groups, Turks settled just about everywhere and
are distributed equally over the urban areas of the country, in Brussels and in
Antwerp, but especially in Ghent and Limburg. The Turkish community in Belgium
is composed of persons of diverse ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds,
including Turks of Kurdish origin, Christians, Sunnis, and Alevis.
Economic recession and the crisis that struck the coal industry (leading to
increased unemployment), in the early 1970s, led to a restrictive migration policy
and left many of the guest workers who were already in the country unemployed. It
was difficult for the Turkish miners to adapt to the labor market after the mines
closed down for they were unable to speak Flemish or French. However, despite the
fact that work opportunities ceased to exist and there seemed to be no future pros-
pects due to the new restrictive policy, immigration was not brought to a halt. The
Moroccans and Turks stayed in the country and, although there was a “migration
stop” for labor migration, new immigrants from Morocco and Turkey kept on enter-
ing the country through the process of family reunification and family formation.
In the mid-1980s, the Belgian government accepted the fact that the planned
temporary migration seemed to have a more permanent character and began to
develop policies to encourage immigrants to settle in the country and to integrate
into society. The law on the entrance, residence, settlement, and return of foreigners,
which is still in force, was passed in December 1980. This law provided more legal
security regarding residence and it introduced a legal process for foreigners to
contest measures questioning the legality of their stay. In 1981 an anti-racism law
g˘
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was passed. At that time, the political class still refused to grant voting rights at the
local level to foreigners.
 
41
 
In the mid-1980s the country suffered from a high and persistent level of unem-
ployment. The immigrant population became easy scapegoats. The government
implemented, with not too much success, a policy to encourage immigrants to
return home. Simultaneously, an integration policy was established. In 1984, the
Nationality Code, which was almost 50 years old, was replaced by a new one. The
new Nationality Code introduced the principle of 
 
jus soli
 
42
 
 and simplified the proce-
dure for naturalization. Children born on Belgian soil to foreign parents who them-
selves were born in Belgium became Belgian citizens. Although simplified, the
naturalization process still required individuals to demonstrate a “desire to inte-
grate” measured arbitrarily by the administration. The right to political participation
of the migrant communities was heavily debated. The government decided not to
grant political rights, but to relax the conditions for acquiring Belgian nationality.
This had a significant impact during this period. The number of applications more
than doubled the year after the adoption of the new law. The Nationality Code was
revised again and passed in its new form on March 1, 2000. Since then, any
foreigner legally residing for at least seven years in Belgium who has a permanent
residence permit can become Belgian with a simple declaration without a check on
his or her “desire to integrate.” Between 1990 and 2002, over 400,000 foreigners
have become Belgians under this provision.
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The so-called “new Belgians”—foreigners who acquired Belgian citizenship—
participated in all social activities and could join political parties. Since 1994, many
cities and regions have elected “new Belgians” to political office, at the local,
regional, as well as national level. Some even hold posts in executive functions, thus
giving evidence of their integration into Belgian society. While successful by many
accounts, the Belgian government’s policies for integrating immigrants, like those
of neighboring countries, have been accompanied by restrictive policies on
newcomers.
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The impressive electoral success of the 
 
Vlaams Blok
 
 in the city of Antwerp in the
1989 elections (the first in a series of electoral victories) led to the creation of a
government service that would monitor the position of the immigrant population
called the Royal Commissioner for the Policy on Immigrants. This task has
been taken up since 1990 by the successor organization, the Center for Equal
Opportunities and the Fight against Racism.
Of the first wave of Turkish immigrants, 30 percent were illiterate. The profile is
slowly changing. The number of Turkish students has doubled since the 1970s.
Technical and vocational schools are not popular among Belgian students: approxi-
mately 10 percent attend these schools. In comparison, 70 percent of Turkish students
prefer to attend technical and vocational schools. Second-generation students show a
stronger preference for these schools and they often leave after completing higher
secondary education.
 
45
 
 Data on the qualifications of newcomers are hard to find and
are often incomplete, but ongoing research shows that the Turkish newcomers in
Flanders are still lower skilled than the people arriving from other countries.
 
46
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Education among the second generation, especially compared to other groups, is
still quite limited and many of them have turned to trade.
 
47
 
 The third generation
deviates from the previous ones with a higher rate of university graduates. The
numbers of Turkish students who attend university have increased over the decades
even if in real terms their numbers still remain low in comparison to natives and
other immigrant youth. Approximately 40 percent of them are female. Even though
they are concentrated in Flemish regions, success rates are higher in French-speak-
ing universities. Nearly half of the Turkish females who study at this level prefer to
study medicine while the male population who reach this level prefer economics,
international trade, political science, and the like. Seventy percent of those who
begin university are able to graduate.
 
48
 
One reason for the poor level of education among Turkish migrants is the fact that
the children do not master the language of education sufficiently. Preschool atten-
dance is still quite low amongst Turkish children, and this directly affects school
performance later on. Children are not able to grasp the language or socialize with
the Belgian children, thus causing frustration and learning problems once they start
primary school. However, the situation seems to be changing in the third generation.
The role education plays in the integration process is further elaborated in the piece
by Veysel Özcan and Janina Söhn, elsewhere in this volume.
The direct consequence of poor schooling is the lack of vocational qualifications.
Europe’s Turks suffer greatly from this. As a result, the majority of Europe’s work-
ing Turks have insecure low-paid unskilled jobs. In most cases the children follow
in their parents’ footsteps. The number of young Turks who have university degrees
is rather small even if it is growing. These socio-professional characteristics margin-
alize the Turkish community on the labor market.
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 Low educational qualifications
result in a poor position in the labor market. Turkish immigrants in Belgium are
more likely than any other group to be blue-collar workers, earning less than the
Belgians or other migrant groups.
 
50
 
 They are mainly situated in industry and
the service sector, and are heavily represented in agriculture and horticulture, metal-
lurgy and the waste processing industry. Contrary to the Austrian situation, male
Turks have a much lower employment rate than the male Belgian population. Also
Turkish women are less active in the labor market.
 
51
 
 And yet research by Martens
and others found that Turks with a Belgian nationality do slightly better than
Turkish nationals working in Belgium.
 
52
 
The first-generation unskilled labor force was relatively less affected by unem-
ployment or the problems it incurred. Nevertheless, the second generation was
affected by the Belgian market’s multiple crises since the 1970s. Hence, they expe-
rience higher unemployment rates.
 
53
 
 In the year 2000, nearly half of the active
Turks living in the Walloon region were unemployed. In the Flemish region, Turks’
unemployment was only 25 percent. It reached 35 percent in Brussels. Turkish
women account for 40 percent of the unemployed Turkish population.
 
54
 
The average unemployment rate of Turks in Belgium is much higher than the
overall unemployment rate. An analysis of some labor market data for 2003 in
Flanders illustrates the poor position of the Turkish population in the labor market.
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The Turkish population represents only 0.5 percent of the working population in
Flanders, but represents 1.9 percent of the unemployed. The overall unemployment
rate was 8 percent. For people with a Belgian nationality it was 7 percent, for non-
Belgians 15 percent, for the Moroccan population it was 27 percent and for the
Turkish population it was 29 percent.
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 The pressure of unemployment and the
increasing difficulty of getting work have played a critical role in the initiative taken
by some immigrants to set up their own businesses. The number of these businesses
has doubled in the last 25 years. The preferred businesses are grocery stores, fruit
and vegetable stores, bakeries, “doner” takeaway shops, restaurants and cafes.
These account for 75 percent of preferred businesses,
 
56
 
 in which sector Turkish
immigrants are heavily represented.
 
Conclusion
 
Austria and Belgium are relatively small countries. A significant proportion of the
population residing in both countries consists of immigrants from non-EU countries.
Both countries have similar histories of (recent) immigration. In the 1960s and
1970s, guest workers were encouraged to come and settle temporarily. However, the
economic downturn that followed the oil crisis in 1973 accompanied by major struc-
tural changes in each economy led to the decision to stop the recruitment of labor
from abroad. However, guest workers not only stayed on and became immigrants,
but immigration has continued through family reunification. Immigrants of both
countries have difficulties integrating into the labor market and lag significantly
behind the host society in respect of educational performance, which in turn aggra-
vates their employment situation. The difficulties that immigrants face regarding
integration have played a critical role in fueling anti-immigrant feelings. The rise of
the Right in the domestic politics of both countries impacted on the evolution of
immigration policies in each country in respect of employment and especially citi-
zenship rights. Often these policies have caused the challenges of integration that
immigrants face to become even greater.
On the labor market, Turkish migrants fare worse than the other migrant commu-
nities, both in Austria and Belgium. There are, however, some remarkable differ-
ences between the countries regarding unemployment figures. The unemployment
rate is much higher in Belgium than in Austria. In Belgium, foreigners in general
and Turks in particular are much more frequently unemployed than the Belgians. In
comparison, the unemployment rate of foreigners in Austria is only slightly higher
than the unemployment rate of the Austrians. The employment rate of the foreigners
in Austria is higher than that of the Austrians. The situation in Belgium is the oppo-
site: here, the Turkish population participates less in the labor market than the
Belgium population.
Austria sanctions unemployment. An extended period of unemployment can cost
immigrants the legal base of their stay. This is not the case in Belgium, where there
is no limit to the duration of unemployment benefits for breadwinners and single
persons. There is no link between any benefit entitlement and the right to stay in the
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country. Belgian unemployment insurance leads to what is called the unemployment
trap, since it discourages the labor force from re-entering the labor market. This is
one of the factors accounting for the high unemployment rate of the Turkish popula-
tion in Belgium.
The Turkish population in Austria and Belgium emigrated from Turkey around
the same period in history. Forty years later, the socio-economic position of the
Turkish migrants in both countries is very similar. The Turkish men, as well as
Turkish women, have a low level of education, even when compared with other
migrant groups. This is a central factor that leads to a poor labor market position.
They are often unemployed or occupy positions in the least favorable sectors and
earning less than other laborers. The second generation generally has not done much
better than their parents. Turks who naturalized and acquired the nationality of the
host country occupy apparently slightly better positions, but it is hard to prove any
causality.
Another difference between the countries is their approach to the acquisition of
citizenship. Naturalization is difficult to achieve in Austria, even for children of the
third generation. The Austrian legislation is based on the principle of 
 
jus sanguinis
 
;
in comparison, the new Belgian Nationality Code introduced the principle of 
 
jus
soli
 
 and simplified the procedure for naturalization. The naturalization process is a
relatively simple administrative process, open to a large group of foreigners.
Acquiring the nationality of the country of residence improves the legal situation of
the immigrants. For instance, foreigners enjoy social and civil rights, although no
political rights. This is, in the Belgian case, the reason why foreigners remain
excluded from national and regional elections. The logic behind it is that if one
wishes to integrate and to participate actively in political life, one can easily apply
for Belgian citizenship.
If 
 
structural integration
 
 implies that immigrants and their descendants have equal
access to the major institutions of society, among which are education and the labor
market, it can be concluded that the integration of the Turkish population was not a
complete success story, either in Austria or in Belgium. Do these findings imply the
unmitigated failure of the Austrian and Belgian integration policy? To answer this
question, it is useful to go back to the question raised in the introduction: 
 
how can
we define integration
 
. Should we rely on the definition given today or on the defini-
tion society used one, two, three or four decades ago? What sort of indicators can
measure successful integration? And which sorts of policy measures introduced in
different countries have been successful? Why, for which groups and in what
domain?
There is a need for further research to answer these questions and question 
 
why
 
?
Why do many 
 
Turkish
 
 immigrants fail to integrate? To answer this, it will be neces-
sary to go beyond the structural elements of integration and also look at social and
cultural integration. Structural elements like the integration of immigrants into the
labor market are relatively easy to measure and compare. But the other aspects of
integration and especially their interplay with structural integration should not be
overlooked. Social integration, the level of social interaction between immigrants or
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ethnic minorities and the wider society is crucial, as well as cultural integration, the
degree of identification with various norms and values of the host country. These
dimensions of integration are clearly more difficult to measure than labor market
participation and school enrollment.
Regardless of the differences and similarities between the countries studied and
the particularities within each country, it can be stated as a general conclusion that
both countries—like many other European countries—still have to learn how to
handle immigration and how to deal with the question of citizenship. A better inte-
gration of the migrant population, however it is defined, can only be achieved within
a society that tolerates and respects all groups it is composed of, whatever their
ethnic origin, cultural background or religious affiliation. The receiving countries
have to offer the structural setting that allows newcomers to find their place in the
host society. But integration is a 
 
two-way process that also implies the involvement
of the migrant population and their descendants. Integration is not a matter of adap-
tation or assimilation, but a matter of respect, mutual acceptance and participation.
This also means the willingness of immigrants to accept responsibility for this
process, participate actively and take up their roles and responsibilities in a perma-
nent dialogue.
It remains to be seen how it would be possible to break out from the vicious circle
of weak immigrant integration, the rise of anti-immigrant feelings and adoption of
legislation that is discriminatory against immigrants and immigration, and actually
succeed in initiating an integration process that is actually and genuinely two-way.
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